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The effect of  existing tax rules on charitable contributions has been the 
subject of several econometric studies in recent years.’ The present paper 
uses the results of  those studies as the basis for examining the potential 
effects of  alternative tax rules that might be applied in extending the 
charitable deduction to  nonitemizers2  Our focus is on the effect that such 
changes in  tax  rules would have  on charitable contributions, on tax 
liabilities, and on the distribution of  these effects by income class. 
Our methodological emphasis is on simulating behavioral responses to 
nonlinear tax rules, e.g. a rule that allows nonitemizers to deduct charita- 
ble gifts in excess of $300 per year. We examine three types of response to 
such nonlinear rules. The first is based on conventional demand analysis 
with  a nonlinear budget  constraint. The second recognizes that indi- 
viduals have an incentive to respond  to a floor by  “bunching”  their 
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contributions over time, e.g. by contributing only in alternate years to 
reduce the fraction of  total contributions that are below the floor and 
therefore that do not receive the tax benefit. The third approach departs 
from the usual utility maximization model of demand to consider a quite 
different type of altruistic behavior that may be appropriate for studying 
charitable contributions. The essential feature of this approach is that it 
assumes each individual wishes to make charitable gifts with some fixed 
net-of-tax cost; changes in tax rules alter the gross amount of giving to 
maintain this net cost. 
All three approaches are generally consistent with the available statis- 
tical evidence. The behavior of  taxpayers under existing rules does not 
allow a choice among the three models; in statistical terms, the model is 
underidentified. This underidentification does not affect predictions of 
the effects of alternative linear tax rules, e.g. substituting a credit for the 
existing deduction. Although the predicted effects of an alternative linear 
tax rule do not depend on which of  the three models is assumed to be 
~orrect,~  with nonlinear tax rules the three models can have very different 
implications. Predictions of  the effects of  nonlinear tax rules must there- 
fore be regarded as conditional on the model specification, and any user 
of  our analysis must “weight” these conditional predictions by his own 
subjective probabilities of  the appropriateness of  the model. 
The simulations are all made with the National Bureau of  Economic 
Research TAXSIM model. This computerized model, like the one used 
by the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation, bases its calcula- 
tions on the large stratified random sample of individual tax returns that 
are provided for this purpose by the Internal Revenue Service. But unlike 
these other models, the NBER TAXSIM model is specifically  designed to 
take into account the response of  taxpayer behavior to changes in tax 
rules.‘ The version of  the model used in the present paper is based on the 
tax law for 1977 and uses a sample of 23,111 individual tax returns for that 
year.’ 
The first section of the paper summarizes the previous econometric 
evidence on charitable giving that forms the basis for the parameter 
values used in the current simulations. Section 5.2 describes the alterna- 
tive tax rules and the three models of  behavior that will  be simulated. 
Some technical aspects of  the simulation procedure, including the im- 
putation  of  contributions to nonitemizers  and  the  calculation of  the 
effective cost of charitable gifts, are discussed in section 5.3. The simula- 
tion results are presented in sections 5.4 and 5.5. There is a brief conclud- 
ing section. 
3. The choice between the third model and the first two does have some effect on the 
4. The economists who have participated in the development of  the TAXSIM model are 
5. These 23,111 returns are a random 25%  sample of  the 1977 Treasury Tax Model 
estimated response to changes in tax rules, but the size of  the effect is relatively small. 
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Public Use Sample. 141  Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior 
5.1  Econometric Evidence on Charitable Giving 
Since this paper will not present any new econometric evidence on 
charitable giving, it is useful to review the previous research. The current 
tax law allows any taxpayer who itemizes his deductions to subtract the 
value  of  charitable  contributions in  calculating taxable  income.  The 
“price” of one dollar’s contribution to a charitable organization in terms 
of the foregone disposable income of the donor therefore varies inversely 
with his marginal tax rate. Of course, for anyone who does not itemize his 
deductions, the price of  one dollar’s contribution is one dollar of  fore- 
gone disposable income.6 
The key parameter that determines the effect of the existing charitable 
deduction and of alternative linear tax rules is the price elasticity, i.e. the 
elasticity of the individual’s gross (pretax) charitable gift with respect to 
the price of  giving. The appropriate value is of course the partial elastic- 
ity, holding constant the level of  income and such other demographic 
characteristics that might be associated with the price. Several studies in 
recent years, based on quite different bodies of  data, have concluded that 
the price elasticity of  giving is  between -  1.0 and -  1.5. There is  a 
striking degree of  consistency and relative precision in these estimates 
even though they are based on different years and different types of data. 
Feldstein (1975a, b)  used the data published by the Internal Revenue 
Service on the mean level of  charitable giving and the mean level of 
disposable income in each of  twenty-seven adjusted gross income (AGI) 
classes for the alternate years between 1948 and 1968. These data refer 
only to individuals who itemized their deductions. A constant elasticity 
specification was estimated: 
(1)  In  Gi,  = bo + bl In  P,, + b, In  Y,, + ei,  , 
where Ci,  is the mean charitable gift of individuals in AGI class i in year t, 
P,, is the price calculated at the mean taxable income in that class, and Y,, 
is the mean disposable income in that class. The changing tax rates as well 
as the differences in the rates among classes were used to estimate the 
price elasticity. The basic estimate in  this study, with the sample re- 
stricted to taxpayers whose AGIs were between $4,000 and $100,000 at 
1967 prices,  was -  1.24 with  a standard error of  0.10.  Including all 
income classes in the sample raised the elasticity to -  1.46 with a stan- 
dard error of  0.08. 
Feldstein  and Clotfelter (1976) used individual household data col- 
lected by the Census Bureau in 1963 and 1964 for the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Survey of Financial Characteristics of  Consumers. Their sample 
of  1,406 individuals provided information on wealth and demographic 
6. This ignores the special problem of  gifts of appreciated property, a subject to which 
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characteristics as well as on income and charitable giving. The data made 
it possible to estimate for each household the price of  charitable giving 
and a measure of disposable income defined as the total income received 
minus an estimate of  the tax that would be due if  no contribution were 
made. The basic price elasticity estimate in this study was -  1.15 (stan- 
dard error 0.20). Several variants of the basic equation showed that the 
estimated price elasticity was not sensitive to the measurement of perma- 
nent income or the inclusion of  a variety of  other demographic and 
economic characteristics. 
Feldstein  and Taylor (1976) used  a similar specification to study a 
sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers who itemized their deductions and 
whose tax returns were included in the 1970 Treasury Tax File, a stratified 
random sample of  individual tax returns. The basic price elasticity esti- 
mate was -  1.29 (standard error 0.06). Repeating this calculation for the 
1962 Treasury Tax File data showed a price elasticity of -  1.09 (standard 
error 0.03). A price elasticity estimate based on the change in the tax 
schedule between 1962 and 1970 was -  1.39 (standard error 0.19). 
Similar estimates were obtained in several other studies using different 
sets of  microeconomic data. Reece (1979) used the 1972-73  Consumer 
Expenditure Survey of  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics and estimated a 
price elasticity of  -  1.19 using a Tobit procedure. Dye (1977) studied 
1974 University of Michigan Survey Research Center data on households 
with incomes under $50,000 and estimated a price elasticity of  -  2.25. 
Clotfelter and Steuerle (1979), using tax data for 1975, estimated a price 
elasticity of -  1.25. And Clotfelter (1980), using the unstratified random 
sample of  tax returns for 1972, obtained a price elasticity of -  1.40. 
These estimates refer to the entire population or to all taxpayers who 
itemized and not to any particular income class. The present analysis of 
the potential effect of extending the charitable deduction to those who do 
not currently itemize their deductions makes it particularly important to 
have an estimated price elasticity for middle and lower income house- 
holds; more than 90% of 1977 nonitemizers had adjusted gross income of 
less than $20,000. Although separate estimates for each income class 
cannot be made as precisely as for the sample as a whole, the evidence 
generally indicates that the relevant elasticity for this group is as high as 
for the population as a whole. 
The pooled data by  year and income class (Feldstein 1975a,b) were 
analyzed in separate regressions for different income groups. For the 
sixty-four observations with mean real income (in 1967 dollars) between 
$4,000 and $10,000, the estimated price elasticity was -  1.80 (standard 
error 0.56). Among taxpayers with real incomes between $10,000 and 
$20,000, the corresponding estimate was -  1.04 (standard error 0.76, 
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Despite the small samples, these data had the advantage of  tax sched- 
ules that varied over time. When attention is limited to a single cross 
section of  individual data, it is more difficult to estimate separate equa- 
tions in each income class. This is particularly true in the low and middle 
income classes, where there is a very high correlation between income 
and tax rates.’ It is nevertheless possible to allow the estimated price 
elasticity to vary with income or marginal tax rate while estimating the 
other parameters from the entire sample. 
The Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) study found that the price elasticity 
was greatest for those with the highest “price of  giving”; the estimated 
elasticity was -  1.82 (s.e. 0.64) for those with a price of giving in excess of 
0.7 and then fell to -  1.26 (s.e. 0.42) for those with a price between 0.3 
and 0.7 and to -  1.16 (s.e. 0.20) for those with a price below 0.3. The 
differences are not statistically significant but, if  anything, provide evi- 
dence that the current nonitemizing population has a higher elasticity. 
The Feldstein and Taylor (1976) study had a much larger sample and 
could therefore obtain estimates with smaller standard errors. The esti- 
mated price elasticities varied inversely with income, from -  2.26 (s.e. 
0.42) for  taxpayers with incomes below $10,000 and -  1.82 (s.e. 0.24) for 
taxpayers with incomes between  $10,000 and $20,000 to -  1.17 (s.e. 
0.09) for those with incomes between $50,000 and $100,000 and -  1.27 
(s.e. 0.06) for those with incomes over $100,000. An analogous equation 
for 1962 is not reported. Estimates of separate price and income elastici- 
ties in each income class give implausible values for the lowest income 
class (those with AGI between $4,000 and $20,000): -  3.67 (s.e. 0.45) for 
1962 and -  0.35 (s.e. 0.52) for 1970. 
In a separate study designed to measure the price elasticity for the 
lower  and  middle income  groups, Boskin  and Feldstein  (1977) used 
survey data collected  in  1974 by  the University of  Michigan  Survey 
Research Center on households with incomes below $30,000. Because 
these are survey data rather than tax return data, they contain informa- 
tion on contributions by nonitemizers as well as itemizers. This provides 
much more price variation at each income level. The Boskin-Feldstein 
analysis estimated a price elasticity of -  2.54 (s.e. 0.28) for this group. 
An additional analysis of these data showed that the difference between 
itemizers and nonitemizers could be explained completely by  the price 
effect without recourse to a separate “itemization” effect. 
Clotfelter and Steuerle (1979) estimated a variety of different specifica- 
tions for separate income classes using the Treasury Tax Model for 1975. 
They found that the estimated results in the lower income class were quite 
7. In higher income classes, there is much more variation in tax rates at each level of 
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sensitive to the particular specification. The basic logarithmic equation 
implied price elasticities of -  0.9 for incomes of  $4,000 to $10,000 and 
-  1.3  for incomes of  $10,000 to $20,000. Estimating a single equation for 
all income classes but using a more general  functional form implied lower 
price elasticities; the estimates ranged between -  0.4 and -  0.7. But 
constraining the coefficient to  be the same for all income classes reverses 
this effect and implies price elasticities of -  2.2 and -  1.4. In our view, 
this sensitivity shows the difficulty of  trying to infer separate elasticities 
for low and middle income groups. 
Before turning to the simulations, it is useful to consider the plausibil- 
ity of  a price elasticity between 1 and 2 for a typical nonitemizing family. 
In  1977, families with  adjusted gross  incomes between  $10,000  and 
$15,000 who itemized their deductions gave an average of $522. If such a 
family had a taxable income of  $8,000, the price per dollar of  giving would 
be approximately 80 cents. A price elasticity of  -  1  .O and a price of 0.80 
imply that deductibility raises giving by 25%, i.e. by $104 from $418 to 
$522. Similarly, a price elasticity of -  2.0 implies that deductibility raised 
giving by 56%, or by $188 from $334 to $522. Changes of this magnitude 
are not contrary to intuition or to any other evidence. 
To  be conservative, the estimates  developed in this paper will generally 
be based on a price elasticity of -  1.3. Some additional estimates using 
price elasticities of  -  0.7, -  1.0, and -  1.6 will also be presented. 
5.2  Extending the Contribution Deduction to Nonitemizers 
The basic proposal to be analyzed in this paper allows all taxpayers to 
deduct charitable contributions  in the calculation  of  taxable income. 
More specifically, taxpayers who itemize other deductions would con- 
tinue to include charitable contributions  as part of  their  deductions. 
Taxpayers who do not itemize other deductions would be allowed to 
subtract their charitable contribution from gross income in the same way 
that they now subtract an amount for each exemption. In this way, there 
is no change in adjusted gross income or in  any of  the amounts that 
depend on it. 
This basic scheme might be modified by limiting the charitable deduc- 
tion of  nonitemizers  to the excess over some dollar amount or some 
percentage of  the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. A rationale for such 
a  “floor”  is  that  the standard deduction  implicitly  recognizes  some 
minimal or  typical charitable gift so that individuals should get an explicit 
deduction only for the excess over that amount.S  An alternative rationale 
8. The logic of  that  argument is  hardly  compelling.  If  the  charitable  deduction  is 
extended nonitemizers, it would be more appropriate to reduce the standard deduction by 
the currently assumed amount of  the “typical” gift and then allow all individuals the full 
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for a floor is that it can reduce the loss of  tax revenue and, to the extent 
that contributions exceed the floor amount, the reduction in revenue loss 
would have no impact on the marginal incentive to give. For example, in 
1977 taxpayers with AGIs between  $15,000 and $20,000 who did not 
itemize made charitable gifts averaging nearly $400. For someone giving 
an average amount, a $300 floor would have no effect at the margin on the 
incentive to give. The current paper analyzes two alternative floors: the 
first is $300, and the alternative is 3% of  AGI. 
5.2.1  The Conventional Demand Model 
The effects of extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers, and 
particularly the effects of  the floors, depend on the type of  individual 
behavior that is assumed. The most basic behavioral assumption, and the 
one that underlies  the specification of  the econometrically estimated 
equations, is that individual giving responds to a change in price accord- 
ing to the constant elasticity formula: 
where GI is the level of annual giving after the “reform,” Go  is the level of 
annual giving before the reform,y  Po is the price before the reform,’O PI is 
the price after the reform, and a  is the price elasticity of demand. There is 
no need to adjust separately for the change in disposable income since the 
estimated price elasticity includes the income effect as well as the sub- 
stitution effect; i.e. the initial econometric equation defines the dispos- 
able income as AGI minus the tax that would be due if  the individual 
made no charitable contribution. 
More specifically, equation (2.2) describes what is essentially the re- 
sponse of nonitemizers (i.e. those who under existing law are nonitemiz- 
ers) when they are allowed to deduct charitable gifts. For most itemizers, 
the proposal involves no change in behavior.  However, about 6%  of 
current itemizers would cease to itemize if  they could then deduct their 
charitable contributions; i.e. their itemized deductions excluding charita- 
ble contributions are less than the standard deduction  to which  they 
would be entitled.’l For most of  these “switchers” there is no change in 
marginal tax rate and therefore no change in price. However, since an 
individual switches only if  his tax bill is reduced, there is a small income 
9.  The method of  imputing an initial level of  giving for nonitemizers is discussed in 
section 5.3 of this paper. 
10. For nonitemizers,  Po differs from 1 only because of gifts of  appreciated property. 
This difference is discussed in section 5.3.  Although as a practical matter the difference from 
1 for this group is small enough to ignore completely, our price calculations do reflect for 
each individual the average percentage of  appreciated property in total contributions. 
11. In 1977, the standard deduction was $3,200 for a married couple and $2,200 for a 
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effect. The giving of  a  switcher can  be  calculated  according to  the 
equation 
(2.2) 
where Yo  is the initial value of total income minus the tax liability if  the 
individual makes no contribution and Y,  is the corresponding value if the 
individual stops itemizing and uses the standard deduction.’2  The differ- 
ence between Yl  and Yo  is the tax that the individual saves by switching 
from itemizing to using the standard deduction, given that the charitable 
contribution is deductible in any case. 
Although the demand behavior implied by equation (2.1) is adequate 
for estimation and for simulating alternative linear budget constraints, it 
is inadequate for  analyzing alternative nonlinear  budget  constraints. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the nature of  this problem in a simple case. The 
standard deductor initially faces a budget line UVW with a slope of -  1 
between giving (G) and other spending (C).  He chooses point El.  Allow- 
ing standard deductors to take an additional deduction for charitable gifts 
above a floor (F)  puts a kink in the budget line which becomes UVX. 
In the case shown in figure la,  the individual was giving more than the 
floor even without the deduction. For such an individual, the deductibil- 
ity with a floor is equivalent to an ordinary price change except for an 
offsetting negative income effect equal to mF,  where m is the individual’s 
marginal tax rate. This case could therefore be analyzed using the de- 
mand function of equation (2.2) with appropriate definitions of PI and Y1. 
In the case shown in figure lb, the individual was giving less than the 
floor.  The  change  in  the  budget  constraint  therefore  occurs  in  an 
irrelevant section of the budget constraint and the individual continues to 
give at El.  This could also be analyzed using the demand function, since 
the price is unchanged for this individual. 
But  the choice  in  figure  lc cannot  be  analyzed with  the demand 
function. The individual initially gives an amount less than the floor F. 
But the individual’s indifference curve cuts the new branch of the budget 
constraint, implying that the individual’s optimum point is on the new 
branch. This can only be determined by  an explicit utility comparison. 
In order to be able to deal with situations like figure lc, we therefore 
continue the analysis with the help of  an explicit utility function that 
implies the constant elasticity demand structure of  equation (2.2). We 
follow Hausman (1979) and write the indirect utility function of  indi- 
vidual i as 
GI = Go(Pi/Po)*(  YI/Yo)’  , 
y’ -  P 
l+a  1-p  vt  (p,y)  = -  kip=  + - 
12. An income elasticity of  0.7 is used  in the calculations; see Feldstein and Taylor 
(1976) for supporting  evidence. Because the relevant income changes are always very small, 
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Fig. 5.1  Alternative response to deductibility above a floor. 
This indirect utility function implies a demand function with constant 
price elasticity  (Y  and constant income elasticity  p. Since existing law 
provides a linear budget constraint from small changes in giving,13  we can 
use the price and income elasticities estimated in previous studies with 
equation (2.1) to parameterize this utility function. The value of  ki for 
individual i can then be calculated as the value which causes the demand 
for giving implied by equation (2.3) for individual i to equal the actual 
observed amount of  giving. 
With the help of such a parameterized indirect utility function for each 
individual, we proceed in the following way to calculate the value that 
each individual would give if nonitemizers could deduct gifts in excess of 
floor F. (To  simplify the description of  our procedure,  we now ignore gifts 
of  appreciated property and the possibility that giving causes the indi- 
vidual to change tax  bracket^.)'^ 
First, if  the initial giving of individual i (Goi)  exceeds the floor (F),  we 
can use equation (2.3)  to calculate the new level of  giving by reducing the 
price of  1 to 1 -  mi (where  mi is the individual’s marginal tax rate) and by 
lowering the individual’s income by miF. We then use these values to 
calculate the new level of  giving, Gli.  This corresponds to figure la. 
If Goi  is less than the floor, we consider first the potential reaction if the 
individual faces the reduced price above the floor. If  with this price (and 
the associated income correction) the implied giving is still less than the 
floor, we know we  are in case  lb, in which giving is unchanged.  If, 
however, the implied giving is greater than the floor, we are  in case lc  and 
must choose between the possibilities by comparing the implied utilities. 
Conditional on the assumption that the individual will not change his 
giving (i.e. will remain at El in figure lc  because the indifference curve 
tangent to  the new section of the budget line is lower than the indifference 
13.  There is a nonlinearity for the few individuals whose giving causes them to switch 
brackets or to move from nonitemizer to itemizer. Ignoring the switch from nonitemizer to 
iternizer biases the estimated price elasticity toward 0. 
14. The full computer program recognizes both of  the possibilities. The method of 
dealing with property gifts is discussed in section 5.3.  Changes in tax brackets are reflected 
by using the new marginal price and changing the initial level of  income. 148  Martin Feldstein/Lawrence B. Lindsey 
curve tangent at El),  we evaluate the utility at the initial price (pi  = 1)15 
and unchanged income, say Voi.  Then, conditional on the assumption 
that the individual increases his giving (i.e. moves to point E2 in figure 
lc), we take pi  to be the itemized price (8  = 1 -  mi,  except for gifts of 
appreciated property) and reduce income by  mjF. This implies an in- 
creased value of  giving Gli  and an associated utility value Vlj.  The choice 
between the two points is then made by comparing Voi and VIi  for the 
individual. 
An analogous calculation  is used to analyze the possibility  that an 
individual who is currently an itemizer might switch to  using the standard 
deduction if he could continue to itemize his charitable gifts. To decide 
whether to switch, the individual compares his utility level as an itemizer 
with the utility  level that he would  achieve as a nonitemizer  who can 
deduct his charitable giving. In practice, about 6% of  current itemizers 
would  find  that it  is  desirable  to use  the standard deductions when 
charitable gifts become eligible for a separate deduction. 
5.2.2  The Bunching of  Gifts 
The use of a floor provides an incentive for individuals to “bunch” their 
charitable giving. With a $300 floor, a nonitemizer who gives $300 each 
year would get no tax reduction. By giving $600 every other year, the 
individual would also have a $300 tax deduction every other year, or a 50 
cent deduction per dollar of  contribution. And by giving $900 every third 
year, the deduction would rise to 67 cents per dollar of  gift. Although the 
‘‘logical’’ extreme is of  course implausible because of  the resulting effect 
on the individuals’ marginal tax rates and because individuals and institu- 
tions both have reasons to favor a steady flow of  giving, the presence of a 
floor seems very likely to lead to some bunching. 
There  is, unfortunately, no experience with charitable deduction floors 
that can be used to estimate their likely effect on bunching. We have, 
however, constructed two alternative simulation models and tested the 
parametric sensitivity of  the results. 
Both models  assume that the extent  of  bunching  depends on the 
potential tax saving from bunching and therefore on both the size of  the 
contribution and the individual’s marginal tax rate. In both models the 
possibility  of  bunching is limited to a two-year cycle. The first model 
assumes that each individual bunches either all of  his contributions or 
none. That is, if  he is a “buncher,” he gives only in alternate years. The 
probability of being a buncher depends on the tax incentive. The second 
model assumes that everyone is  a “partial buncher”; some fraction of  his 
total giving is bunched (i.e. given only in alternate years) while the rest of 
15.  In the actual calculations,p, is lower than 1  because of gifts of  appreciated property. 149  Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior 
his contribution is given every year. We will now describe these models as 
they apply to someone who is currently a nonitemizer.I6 
The tax incentive to bunch is a function of  the relative cost of  giving 
with and without bunching. Let Gli  be the amount that individual i (a 
nonitemizing taxpayer) would give if  charitable gifts in excess of  a floor 
could be deducted.” Let CGli  be the net cost to  individual i of making this 
charitable gift in a single year, i.e. without bunching. CGli  is equal to Glj 
reduced by the tax saving associated with the contribution, i.e. the tax 
saving  that  results  from deducting  the excess of  Glj  over the floor. 
Similarly, let BCGlj  be the net cost of  making this charitable gift by 
bunching two years’ gifts into a single year.lS  We assume that the propen- 
sity to bunch depends on the ratio of  these net costs: BCGICG. 
More specifically,  the first model assumes that the probability  that 
individual i will bunch is given by 
(2.4)  PROBj = 1 -  (BCGli/CG$ 
with  p>O.  Note that  under current law,  with  no floor,  there is  no 
incentive to bunch:I9  BCG = CG and PROB = 0. However, a floor on the 
charitable deductions implies BCG <  CG and therefore PROB >  0. The 
greater the value of  p, the more sensitive the probability of  bunching to 
the relative cost. To appreciate the order of  magnitude of  this effect, 
consider  a  taxpayer  who  would  contribute  $400  without  bunching 
(Glj  = 400) and whose marginal tax rate is 30%. With a $300 floor, the 
cost of  giving is $370 with no bunching and $325 with bunching. Thus 
PROB = 1 -  (325/370)” = 1 -  (0.88)p.  If  p = 2,  PROB = 0.23,  while 
p = 0.5 implies PROB = 0.06 and p = 10 implies PROB = 0.73.  Since 
econometric evidence about p is unavailable, the simulations show the 
sensitivity of  the conclusions to alternative values of  p. 
Of course, those individuals who bunch change the amount of their gift 
because of  bunching. If without bunching the individual’s gift is below the 
floor while bunching  makes the gift (in the year in  which it is given) 
greater than the floor, there is a reduction in the price of  giving and 
therefore an incentive to give more. Among those whose gift would be 
16. For itemizers, the possibility of  switching is again evaluated by comparing the tax 
liability as an itemizer with the tax liability as a nonitemizer, but this time including the 
effect of  bunching. 
17. The calculation of  Gli was described in section 5.2.1. 
18. This is calculated by finding the tax reduction associated with contributing  2G1,,  i.e. 
the tax  saving that  results from deducting the  excess of  2G1, over the floor, and then 
subtracting half of  this tax saving from GI,. 
19. This assumes that the individual cannot predict year-to-year changes in his marginal 
tax rate. In fact, there is some predictable variation and therefore some incentive to bunch. 
Although we believe this is likely to be small, some investigation with the longitudinal tax 
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above the floor without bunching, bunching has a positive income effect 
on the amount of  the gift. 
In general, a floor reduces the loss of  tax revenue that results from 
extending the deduction to nonitemizers and also reduces the incentive to 
give associated with such an extension. Bunching increases the revenue 
loss but, even in the case of  complete bunching, still leaves a smaller 
revenue loss than with no floor. However, even with bunching the incen- 
tive to give is not as great as without a floor. Whether the floor raises or 
lowers the tax-revenue “loss”  per dollar of  induced extra giving is an 
empirical question that we will examine in section 5.5 with the help of the 
simulations. 
The alternative “partial bunching” model assumes that all taxpayers 
bunch some  of  their giving  if  there is a floor and that the extent of 
bunching depends on the cost ratio BCGICG. The idea of partial bunch- 
ing  is  based  on the asymmetry  of  information  between  donors and 
donees. Much giving is done in response to requests for contributions and 
is done in such a way that the donee organization and others know the 
amount of the donor’s gift. The individual who responds to a request for a 
contribution by saying “I give every other year and this is my off  year” 
may not be credible. Individuals may also prefer to appear more gener- 
ous, especially for relatively small amounts, by appearing to ignore tax 
considerations. And making a contribution may seem better than trying 
to explain the tax law to the sellers of  Girl Scout cookies or Little League 
decals. 
We assume that the specific incentive to partial bunching is of the same 
form as equation (2.4): 
(2.5)  PROBi = 1 -  (BCGlj/CGl;)P  , 
where PROBi is the proportion of  the charitable gift that individual  i 
bunches. The amounts of  the gifts in the ‘‘low’’ and “high” giving years 
depend on the interaction between bunching, floors, and tax saving. For 
example, if (1 -  PROBi)Gli  is greater than the floor, bunching does not 
change the price of  giving in either year but does have an income effect 
that  raises  giving  to  (say)  GZi. In  this  case,  the  individual  gives 
(1 -  PROBj)G2i  in the low year and (1 + PROBi)G2; in the high year. 
Alternatively, if Glj  is less than the floor but (1 + PROBi)Gli  exceeds the 
floor, there are both price and income effects in the “high” year but only 
an income effect in the ‘‘low’’  year. We assume that in the “high” year the 
individual in this case gives 
(1 + PROB,)G~,(P~/P,)~(Y~/Y~J~  , 
where P, reflects the marginal deductibility and Y1  differs from Yo  be- 
cause of  the effects of  the floor (which lowers y,)  and the bunching 
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cise, they are relatively small and further elaborations or refinements 
have no significant effects.*’ 
There is one further aspect of the partial bunching model that deserves 
comment. In the case in which giving without  bunching substantially 
exceeds the floor, the equation that describes partial bunching might still 
leave giving in both years at levels above  the  floor. Since in that case there 
is no gain from bunching, we assume that the proportion bunched is 
actually zero. 
The difference between  the effects of  the two models of  bunching 
depends on the taxpayer’s initial situation. There are cases in which 
partial bunching would save no tax and have no effect on giving while 
total bunching would do both.  There are other cases in which partial 
bunching would have a larger total effect on both giving and tax receipts. 
The  net  balance  is  examined  in  section  5.5  with  the  help  of  the 
simulations. 
5.2.3  Net Altruism 
Although charitable giving can be modeled like other types of  con- 
sumer spending, it is worth considering the possibility that charitable 
behavior is actually “different.”  Individuals may make charitable gifts 
because of  a sense of responsibility, religious devotion, altruism, guilt, or 
other considerations that may cause behavior to differ from traditional 
utility  maximization.  We  emphasize  may  because,  even  with  these 
motivations,  actual charitable  giving might behave just  as traditional 
theory predicts. Certainly the normal price and income elasticities found 
in the econometric studies are consistent with this. 
But individuals might think about charitable giving in terms of  their 
desire to “sacrifice”  or to contribute their “fair share” rather than in 
terms of  the benefits that they can achieve for the donee organization. In 
this case the deductibility of  charitable gifts has the effect of reducing the 
donor’s “sacrifice”  or “net contribution.” To achieve the initial level of 
sacrifice, the donor must increase the size of  his contribution.  If  the 
individual wishes to make a fixed sacrifice regardless of  the tax law, full 
deductibility (with no floor) causes the individual to behave as if he had a 
price elasticity of  -  1; that is, G1 = Go(  PIIPo)  -  since this implies a 
constant net cost of  giving, PIGl = POGO. 
Although the econometric evidence suggests that the price elasticity is 
absolutely larger than 1, the possibility of  a price elasticity of  -  1  cannot 
be ruled out. If  the observed price  elasticity were -  1, the available 
evidence could not be used to  distinguish between the traditional demand 
model and the alternative “net sacrifice” or “net altruism” model. With 
no floor, the two models are observationally equivalent. 
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The presence of  a floor causes a substantial difference between the 
conventional demand model (with a price elasticity of -  1) and the “net 
altruism” model.  Consider an individual who, with no deductibility, 
contributes $400 and whose marginal tax rate is 30%. The net cost to such 
an individual is $400. Allowing deductibility with no floor causes the 
contribution to rise to 400(0.7) -  = 571 dollars. With a $300 floor, the 
conventional model predicts that giving will fall short of  $571 only be- 
cause of a small income effect; the extra tax of  $90 caused by the floor 
would reduce giving by about $5. But the $300 floor implies that the “net 
altruist” must give substantially less than $571 to maintain the original 
$400 net cost. In particular, a total gift of  $443 would have a net cost of 
$400. 
The possibility that individuals decide on the basis of  total net cost 
rather than marginal  net cost implies that a floor does not reduce the loss 
in tax revenue per dollar of induced additional giving. In the example of 
the previous paragraph, deductibility with no floor would cause giving to 
rise by  $171 and tax revenue to fall by  $171 (0.3 x 571). Deductibility 
with a $300 floor would cause giving to rise by $43 and tax revenue to fall 
by  $43 (0.3 x 143). 
The implications of the “net altruism” model will be considered as part 
of  the simulations in section 5.5. 
5.3  Some Technical Aspects of the Simulation Procedure 
As we noted in the introduction to this paper, our simulations use the 
NBER TAXSIM model with the 1977 tax law. Our sample of  23,111 
returns is a one-in-four random sample from the Treasury’s Public Use 
File  of  1977 tax  returns.  In  simulating the effect of  any tax change 
proposal, we use the model to calculate consistent values for each indi- 
vidual of  the price of  giving under the new law, the amount that that 
individual  gives,  and  the  individual’s new  tax  liability.  The  entire 
TAXSIM model with  all features of  the tax  code are used in these 
calculations. By using the sampling weights provided by the Treasury, we 
can then aggregate the individual changes in giving and in tax liabilities to 
obtain estimates for all taxpayers and for taxpayers in each income class. 
Two technical issues in the simulation deserve special attention: (1)  the 
calculation of the price of giving, and (2) the estimation of the initial level 
of  giving of  nonitemizers. 
5.3.1  The Price of  Giving 
The price of  giving is defined as the net cost to the taxpayer of  a 
marginal increase in the charitable contribution. In the simple case of full 
deductibility, there would be a difference between this “last-dollar price” 
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gives enough to change his marginal tax rate. For most taxpayers, and 
especially for those in the income classes that currently do not itemize, 
the level of giving is low enough that there would be little or  no difference 
between the first- and last-dollar prices. When there is a difference, we 
use the last-dollar price and adjust the income term for the effect of  the 
difference between the marginal and inframarginal prices. 
The difference between the first-dollar price and the last-dollar price is 
particularly important when there is a floor. In all cases, the simulation 
algorithm uses a procedure that converges on the marginal price that is 
consistent with the predicted level of  giving. 
In calculating the price of giving it is not enough to use the marginal tax 
rate that the individual  faces on additional earnings.  There are two 
reasons  for this.  First,  a  one-dollar  charitable  gift  and a  one-dollar 
decrease in earnings can affect the individual’s tax liability differently for 
a number of  reasons. The charitable gift can interact with the maximum 
tax on earned income and the deduction limitation,  while a change in 
earnings alters adjusted gross income and therefore the deductions and 
limits  that depend on AGI. We  avoid  these  problems  by  using  the 
TAXSIM model to calculate explicitly the effect on the tax liability of  a 
one-dollar charitable gift.21 
The second problem is that individuals may contribute property as  well 
as cash. When securities or  other appreciated property is given to charity, 
the taxpayer deducts  the market value of the assets and pays no tax on the 
capital gain.**  To the extent that the taxpayer uses appreciated assets to 
make his  gifts,  this  provision  of  the law reduces the cost of  giving. 
Moreover, this aspect applies to nonitemizers as well as to itemizers. 
There are three problems involved in reflecting gifts of  appreciated 
property in the price variable: (1) What fraction of total giving takes the 
form of  appreciated  property? (2) What  fraction  of  the value of  the 
appreciated property is gain that would otherwise be taxed? (3) What is 
the relevant effective tax rate? We follow the procedure  used  in the 
earlier econometric studies from which the price elasticity was derived. 
We calculate each taxpayer’s price as a weighted average of the price of 
cash gifts and the price (or cost) of gifts of  appreciated property, using as 
weights the average fractions of  both types of  gifts in the taxpayer’s AGI 
If the taxpayer would otherwise have sold the contributed prop- 
21.  To reduce rounding error problems, we actually calculate the effect of a ten-dollar 
gift. 
22.  This is consistent with the general proposition that a gift of appreciated property 
does not constitute “recognition” of the gain and that the recipient of the property has the 
same basis as the donor. Since a chanty is not taxed on its own capital gain, the carryover of 
the basis is irrelevant. 
23. The fraction of  total gifts that take the form of property rises from about 3.5% for 
taxpayers with AGIs below $15,000 to  more  than 70% for taxpayers with AGIs over 
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erty immediately, the extra tax saving per dollar of  gift associated with 
giving the property to charity is the product of  the marginal tax rate on 
capital gains (mc) and the ratio of  “gain” to value in the property that is 
contributed (glv). Since the taxpayer also has the option of  postponing 
the sale of the property or giving the property to another individual, the 
actual tax saving is less than mc(glv),  say A x mc x (glv). Although the 
capital gains tax rate (mc) can be calculated explicitly for each individual, 
neither A nor glv is directly observable. In the previous econometric work 
(Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976; Feldstein and Taylor 1976), a maximum 
likelihood procedure was used to estimate the product A(glv) on the 
assumption that this was the same for all individuals. The maximum 
likelihood value of  A(glv) = 0.50 is used in the current calculation. Of 
course, since our focus in this paper is on the low- and middle-income 
taxpayers who now do not itemize (or who would stop itemizing if  a 
separate charitable deduction were allowed), gifts of  appreciated prop- 
erty are relatively unimportant and any errors introduced by our approx- 
imation are likely to be very small. 
5.3.2  The Giving of  Nonitemizers 
Although the tax returns indicate the contributions of  all taxpayers 
who itemized their deductions, no information is available about the 
contribution of nonitemizers under existing law. An initial value of giving 
Goi  must be imputed to each nonitemizer before any of  the calculations 
can begin. This imputation is done by matching each nonitemizer to an 
“equivalent” itemizer and then assigning to the nonitemizer the itemiz- 
er’s gift scaled down to reflect the price difference and any difference in 
income. 
More specifically, our imputation program read in parallel separate 
computer  tapes  for  the  nonitemizers  and  the  itemizers.  For  each 
nonitemizer, the program looked at successive itemizers until a record 
was found with the same adjusted gross income class. The giving and the 
price of the itemizer, GI  and PI, were then used to calculate a trial value 
of  giving for the nonitemizer (GN)  according to the formula 
GN  = GI(PI/PNI)  -  a(YZ/YNI) -  . 
This in  effect assigns to the nonitemizer  the level of  giving that the 
“matched” itemizer would have chosen if  he had not been allowed to 
deduct this contribution,  with  a further correction  for the difference 
between their disposable incomes. 
Of  course, some itemizers choose to itemize only because they make 
large charitable gifts; without their charitable deduction, they would pay 
less tax as nonitemizers. It would be wrong to include these individuals in 
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imputed  giving would  be  too high  for  a  nonitemizer.  We  therefore 
deleted this group in the imputation process. 
Despite this, our procedure can still impute to a nonitemizer a level of 
giving which is so high that, if  he had made that contribution, he would 
have chosen to itemize. We therefore truncate the imputed giving by 
imposing the limit that the initial gift of a nonitemizer must not exceed the 
greater of  the standard deduction reduced by  3% of  AGI and $500. 
5.4  The Basic Simulation Results 
This section presents the simulation results based on the traditional 
demand model of  charitable giving. The analysis compares the implica- 
tions of  alternative price  elasticities and examines the effects of  two 
different floors below which nonitemized gifts are not deductible. 
All of  the calculations refer to 1977. The proposed changes are re- 
garded as modifications in the tax law as of  1977, and all dollar amounts 
are based on the sample of  actual tax returns for 1977. The calculations 
are not  forecasts of  the short-run effects of  a legislative change but 
simulations of what 1977 might have looked like if the tax rules relating to 
charitable gifts had “always” been different.24 
Table 5.1 describes the situation as it actually was in 1977 under the 
existing tax  Approximately 23 million itemizers contributed a 
total of nearly $19 billion. Since the tax returns contain no information 
about gifts by nonitemizers, their “actual” behavior in 1977 under ex- 
isting tax rules must itself be estimated. This estimation procedure has 
already been described in section 5.3.2. The final four columns of table 
5.1 present estimates corresponding to four different price elasticities. It 
is clear that since most nonitemizers have rather low marginal tax rates, 
the choice among the price elasticity assumptions has relatively little 
effect on the estimated total giving by  nonitemizers. The range of  esti- 
mates is from $17.5 billion to $19.7 billion. 
Table 5.2  summarizes the aggregate effects of  alternative ways of 
extending the charitable deduction to  nonitemizers.  These estimates 
include not only the response of those who were nonitemizers in 1977 but 
also the changes in taxes and in giving among itemizers who would switch 
to nonitemizer status if  the tax rule were changed. 
Consider,  for example, the effect of  full deductibility with  a price 
24. See Clotfelter (1980) on the difference between the long-run and the short-run 
responses to changes in tax rates. The response to a permanent change in tax rules might, 
however, be more rapid than the response to transitory changes in tax rates. 
25.  Although these figures  do  not correspond exactly to published IRS numbers because 
we have used a sample of returns, the large size of the sample guarantees  that errors are very 
small. Table  1  Actual and Imputed Charitable Contributions 
Number of  Returns  Mean Charitable Gift 
(x  1,000 
Nonitemizers: a = 
AGI Class  Non- 
(x 1,000)  Itemizers  itemizers  Itemizers  -  .7  -  1.0  -  1.3  -  1.6 
Less than $5,000  194  23,261  364  212  209  206  204 
$5410  1,486  18,249  419  341  334  327  320 
$1&$15  3,057  10,488  522  322  307  293  279 
$15-$20  4,671  7,247  509  415  391  368  346 
$2&$25  4,772  3,017  568  366  336  308  282 
$25-$30  3,209  1,191  679  495  416  352  298 
$30-$50  4,193  57 1  917  624  552  485  423 
Over $50  1,336  83  4,029  600  550  497  447 
All returns  22,916  64,108  819  307  295  283  273 
Total ($ billion)  ...  ...  18,775  19,656  18,881  18,156  17,486 
Note:  Contributions of  itemizers are the actual mean contributions of individuals who itemized their returns in 1977. Contributions of  nonitemizers are 
imputed using the method described in section 5.3 of  the text. Table 5.2  Aggregate Effects of  Extending the Deductibility of Charitable Contributions 
Increase in Giving: a =  Reduction in Tax Revenue: a =  Budgetary Efficiency: a = 
Proposal  -  .7  -1.0  -1.3  -1.6  -.7  -1.0  -1.3  -1.6  -.7  -1.0  -1.3  -1.6 
Full deductibility  2.529  3.506  4.506  5.450  3.991  4.042  4.101  4.160  .63  .87  1.10  1.31 
Floor, $300  2.078  2.879  3.608  4.302  2.314  2.368  2.430  2.484  .90  1.22  1.48  1.73 
Floor, 3% of  AGI  1.729  2.409  3.039  3.610  1.835  1.886  1.943  2.003  .94  1.28  1.56  1.80 
Notes:  All amounts are in billions of  1977 dollars. These calculations assume conventional demand behavior with no bunching, as described in section 5.7 
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elasticity of -  1.0. The simulations imply that this would increase giving 
by  $3.5 billion and would reduce tax revenue by  $4.0 billion. For the 
nonitemizers alone, the price elasticity of 1  .O implies that the revenue loss 
would exactly equal the increase in giving. The excess of the revenue loss 
over the increased giving reflects the fact that previous itemizers who 
switch save substantially more in taxes than the increase, if  any, in their 
giving. The “budgetary efficiency” estimate of  0.87 is the ratio of  in- 
creased giving to reduced taxes implied by extending full deductibility to 
nonitemizers if  the price elasticity is 1. 
A more realistic price elasticity, of  1.3, implies a 29% higher level of 
increased  giving  but  only  2%  greater  revenue  loss.  The  budgetary 
efficiency value rises to 1.10, implying that charities receive an additional 
$1.10 for each extra dollar of  revenue foregone by the Treasury. 
Limiting the deduction of gifts by nonitemizers to the excess over $300 
reduces both the revenue loss and the increased giving. With all these 
elasticities, the increase in giving is reduced by much less than the fall in 
revenue. With an elasticity of -  1.3, for example, the $300 floor reduces 
additional giving by $900 million (from $4.506 billion to $3.608 billion) 
but reduces the tax loss by nearly twice as much (from $4.101 billion to 
$2.430 billion, a decline of  $1.7 billion). 
A floor equal to 3% of  AGI instead of  a flat $300 has quite similar 
aggregate effects. With a price elasticity of -  1.3, giving falls $1.5 billion 
(from $4.506 billion to $3.039 billion) while the tax loss is reduced by 
more than $2.1 billion (from $4.101 to $1.943). Note that increasing the 
floor from $300 to 3% of  AGI actually reduces giving by more than the 
saving in taxes; total giving falls an additional $569 million while the tax 
loss is cut by only $487 million. The primary reason for this is that the 
effect of  the percent-of-AGI floor is concentrated more on those tax- 
payers with high marginal tax rates for whom the relative reductions are 
large. 
Table 5.3 shows the changes in mean giving and tax liabilities in each 
AGI class and, for reference, the initial levels of  giving and tax liabilities. 
These figures combine itemizers and nonitemizers. All of the calculations 
are based on a price elasticity of -  1.3. 
Consider, for example, taxpayers in the $10,000 to $15,000 AGI class. 
Of the 13.5 million taxpayers in this group, 10.5 million were nonitemiz- 
ers in 1977. Extending full deductibility of charitable gifts to all taxpayers 
would cause giving to increase by an average of $74 and taxes to fall by an 
average of $63. A $300 floor would reduce this increase in giving by $20 
but would lower the fall in taxes by $30. Raising the floor from $300 to 3% 
of  AGI would reduce giving by  an average of  $5  and would save an 
average of  $4 in taxes. 
Note that full deductibility has its maximum effect on the giving and 
taxes per return at the income levels between $15,000 and $20,000. Below Table 5.3  Distribution of  Changes in Mean Contributors and Tax Liabilities by Income Class 
Increases in Giving and 
Reductions in Taxes 
Number  Initial  Full Deducti- 
of  Levels  bility  $300 Floor  3% AGI Floor 
AGI Class  Returns 
(x 1,000)  ( x  1,OOO)  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes 
Less than $5  23,455  208  11  5  5  5  3  4  4 
$5-$10  19,735  334  437  61  54  46  32  52  35 
$10-$15  13,545  344  1,206  74  63  54  33  49  29 
$15-$20  11,918  423  2,078  93  84  80  52  65  38 
$20-$25  7,789  467  3,026  61  59  49  32  29  18 
$25-$30  4,399  591  4,274  61  57  50  34  26  16 
$30-$50  4,763  865  6,879  50  50  46  35  24  15 
Over $50  1,419  3,818  29,130  75  70  72  60  40  20 
All returns  87,024  424  1,913  52  47  41  28  35  22 
Total ($ billion)  87.024  36.931  166.456  4.506  4.101  3.608  2.430  3.039  1.943 
Note:  All calculations are based on a price elasticity of  -  1.3 and refer to all taxpayers, including both current itemizers and nonitemizers. 160  Martin Feldstein/Lawrence B. Lindsey 
$10,000 the relatively low marginal tax rates provide less incentive while 
above $20,000 the majority of taxpayers already itemize their deductions. 
Imposition of a $300 floor would have virtually no effect on giving by 
taxpayers with AGIs over $25,000 since most such taxpayers would give 
more than $300 if  deductibility were allowed. The absolute effect of the 
$300 floor on the mean level of  giving is also greatest among taxpayers 
with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000. By contrast, a floor equal to 
3% of AGI has a very substantial effect on the gifts and taxes of relatively 
high income taxpayers. A 3% floor virtually eliminates any tax saving for 
those with incomes over $25,000. Although total giving is lower with a 
3% of AGI floor than with a $300 floor, giving by the large number of 
taxpayers with incomes under $10,000 is slightly higher. 
Although table 5.2 suggests that a floor would be an “efficient” way of 
modifying the extension of  the charitable deduction to all taxpayers (in 
the sense that it would save substantially more tax revenue than it would 
reduce charitable giving), table 5.3 indicates that  a floor would  also 
significantly change the distribution among income classes of  both the 
increased giving and the reduced tax liability. Similarly, table 5.3 makes it 
clear that the choice between a $300 floor and a 3% of AGI floor involves 
not only aggregate efficiency considerations but also the income class 
distribution of  the changes in giving and in tax liabilities. Of  course, 
differences in the income class distribution  of  giving have significant 
effects on the types of  charities that benefit. 
5.5  Simulating Nonstandard Behavior 
All of  the calculations in section 5.4 were based on the conventional 
static utility maximization model of  consumer demand for charitable 
giving. The more dynamic assumption that taxpayers respond to a floor 
by  bunching contributions over time will be examined in the current 
section. The more radical departure from conventional utility maximiza- 
tion, the net altruism model of  charitable giving, will also be considered. 
5.5.1  Bunching 
Any floor on the charitable deduction would provide taxpayers with an 
incentive to “bunch” their charitable contributions, giving a high level of 
contributions in some years and a low level in others. Because the existing 
law does not contain such a floor, we have no evidence about the likely 
extent of bunching. This section therefore presents simulation results for 
a rather broad range of  two-year bunching assumptions. The restriction 
to a two-year cycle is significant and should be borne in mind in consider- 
ing the results. All of the simulations refer to a price elasticity of -  1.3. 
When a taxpayer responds to a floor by bunching his contributions, he 
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increases the tax saving associated with any level of giving. Moreover, to 
the extent that annual unbunched giving would be less than the floor 
while  bunched giving exceeds the floor, the process of  bunching  also 
reduces  the marginal  price  of  giving  and thus  encourages increased 
giving. These two effects apply to both the “total bunching” and “partial 
bunching”  models described in section 5.2. 
Recall that, with the total bunching model, the probability that indi- 
vidual  i will bunch is given by 
(5.1)  PROBi = 1 -  (BCGli/CGli)’ , 
where CGli  is the net cost to taxpayer i of giving the amount that he would 
choose to give in the presence of a floor if he does not bunch and BCGli  is 
the net cost of  giving that amount with bunching. Table 5.4 presents 
simulation results with four different values of the bunching sensitivity 
variable. 
The striking feature of  the results in this table is that bunching appears 
to have only a very modest effect on both tax revenue and giving. For 
example, a $300 floor with no bunching reduces giving by $898 million, 
from $4.506 billion to $3.608 billion. With the bunching described by the 
moderate sensitivity value of  p = 2, the decline in giving is reduced from 
$898 million  to $861 million.  Even with  the high sensitivity  value of 
p = 10, giving is still reduced by $743 million. Indeed, even the limiting 
case in which everyone who can benefit from bunching does bunch still 
leaves the extra giving $427 million lower than without a floor. 
The effect of  bunching  on tax revenue is  limited in a similar  way. 
Without  bunching, the $300 floor reduces the revenue loss by $1.671 
billion, from $4.101 billion to $2.430 billion. Even with the high sensitiv- 
ity  value  of  p = 10, the $1.671 billion  revenue  effect on the floor is 
reduced by only $175 million. This very small effect of  bunching on the 
revenue loss reflects the distribution of  gifts by nonitemizers, particularly 
the large number of  relatively small gifts, for which the floor would 
eliminate all or nearly all deductibility. An individual who gave less than 
$150 a year without bunching would get no deduction even if she bunched 
completely. And a taxpayer who gave $400 every other year instead of 
$200 each year still would get a deduction for only one-fourth of  her total 
giving. 
Table 5.5 presents results for the partial bunching model, in which all 
taxpayers who can benefit from bunching do bunch at least part of their 
gift. The results are similar to the probabilistic total bunching model of 
table 5.4 but indicate even smaller effects on giving and tax revenue.26 
26. The figures for full and partial bunching with p =  30  would be exactly equal if  there 
were  no gifts of  appreciated property. The small difference in our calculations reflects 
differences in the assumed realization of capital gains. Table 5.4  The Effect of Bunching on Aggregate Contribution and Tax Liabilities 
Bunching Sensitivity 
No Bunching,  p = .5,  p = 2.0,  p = 10.0,  P  = m, 
Changes in  Changes in  Changes in  Changes in  Changes in 
Proposal  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes 
Full deductibility  4.506  4.101  (NOT  RELEVANT) 
$300 floor  3.608  2.430  3.617  2.442  3.645  2.447  3.763  2.605  4.079  2.818 
3% of  AGI floor  3.039  1.944  3.051  1.955  3.089  1.988  3.246  2.112  3.686  2.347 
Note:  Changes in giving and taxes are stated in billions of  1977 dollars. See text for definition of  bunching sensitivity. Table 5.5  The Partial Bunching Model 
Bunching Sensitivity 
~~~  ~ 
No Bunching,  p  = .5,  p = 2.0,  p  = 10.0,  P = w, 
Changes in  Changes in  Changes in  Changes in  Changes in 
Proposal  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes  Giving  Taxes 
~  ~~~ 
Full deductibility  4.506  4.101  (NOT  RELEVANT) 
$300 floor  3.608  2.430  3.615  2.431  3.616  2.432  3.730  2.498  4.093  2.825 
3% of AGI floor  3.039  1.944  3.044  1.945  3.045  1.946  3.164  2.008  3.697  2.354 
Note: Changes in giving and taxes are stated in  billions of  1977 dollars. See text for definition of  bunching sensitivity. 164  Martin FeldsteidLawrence B. Lindsey 
Since there is no experience with floors on which to base empirical 
estimates of  the taxpayers’ likely response, it is reassuring that the results 
of  this section are not sensitive to a wide variation in assumptions about 
the possible extent of  bunching. It should, however, be borne in mind 
that  only  two-year  bunching  was  considered  and  that  if  taxpayers 
bunched over a longer period the effects would be more substantial. 
5.5.2  Net Altruism 
The “net altruism” model of  charitable giving described  in section 
5.2.3 implies that individuals choose the amount to contribute to charity 
to achieve a desired net cost to themselves. Individual differences in the 
desired net cost reflect differences in income and taste. Alternative tax 
rules affect charitable giving by altering the amount that individuals can 
contribute per dollar of  net cost. Any loss in tax revenue is matched by an 
equal increase in charitable giving. 
In the simple context of extending the charitable deduction without any 
floor,  net  altruism  is  equivalent  to a  price  elasticity  of  -  1 for  the 
nonitemizers themselves.  However, net altruism implies that the tax- 
payers who switched from itemizing to using the standard deduction will 
add the resulting tax saving to their charitable gifts. Moreover, where 
giving causes a reduction in marginal tax rates, the net altruist contributes 
all of the inframarginal tax saving while traditional demand behavior 
implies that inframarginal saving has only a small income effect. The 
difference between the conventional demand model with unitary price 
elasticity and the net altruism model is shown in the first row of  table 5.6. 
The contrast between conventional demand and net altruism is much 
greater where there are floors.  Table 5.6  shows that the conventional 
demand model with a unitary price elasticity implies that a $300 floor 
causes giving to  fall by $600 million and increases tax revenue $1.7 billion. 
With net altruism, the reduced deductibility has a much greater effect on 
giving. Giving falls by $1.9 billion, and the tax revenue rises by an equal 
amount. The results are similar if  the floor is stated as a percent of AGI. 
If the net altruism model reflects reality, extending the deduction with 
a floor does not have greater budgetary efficiency than full deductibility. 
Introducing the floor in itself no longer increases tax revenue by more 
than it reduces giving. With net altruism, the principal reason for having a 
floor is to reduce the scale and cost of  extending deductibility. The floor 
would of  course also affect the income class distribution of  the induced 
changes in giving and tax payments and therefore the mix of donees that 
benefit. 
The choice  between  the net  altruism  model  and  the conventional 
demand model cannot be settled decisively with the available evidence. 
To the extent that the estimated price elasticity is significantly different 
from -  1, the data do support a conventional demand analysis. But it is Table 5.6  The Effect of Net Altruism Behavior on Aggregate Contributions and Tax Liabilities 
Conventional Demand 
with a =  -1  Net Altruism 
Changes in  Changes in 
Budgetary  Budgetary 
Proposal  Giving  Taxes  Efficiency  Giving  Taxes  Efficiency 
Full deductibility  3.506  4.042  367  3.871  3.951  .979 
$300 floor  2.879  2.368  1.216  1.963  2.008  .978 
3% of  AGI floor  2.409  1.886  1.277  1.543  1.573  .980 
Note:  Changes in giving and taxes are stated in billions of  1977 dollars. See text for definition of  bunching sensitivity. 166  Martin Feldstein/Lawrence  B. Lindsey 
quite possible that some individuals behave according to net altruism 
principles while the behavior of others is best described by a conventional 
demand analysis. If  so, the observed price elasticity is a misleading guide 
to what would happen if  deductibility with a floor were extended. The 
results would then be some mix between the net altruism behavior of 
table 5.6 and the conventional demand response with a price elasticity 
between -  1.3 and -  1.6. 
5.6  Concluding Remarks 
The primary purpose of  the present paper is methodological: to ex- 
amine how tax simulation could be extended to incorporate nonlinear 
budget constraints and nonstandard economic behavior. We have shown 
how econometric estimates derived under existing tax rules can be ex- 
tended to deal with this wider range of  simulations. On those issues for 
which existing evidence is not informative we have presented simulations 
that indicate the sensitivity of  the conclusion to the unknown aspects of 
behavior. 
The specific simulations indicate that the econometric evidence on 
charitable  giving implies that  extending  the  charitable deduction  to 
nonitemizers would raise individual giving by about 12% of  the existing 
total amount, or $4.5 billion at 1977 levels. The extension would reduce 
tax revenue by slightly less, about $4.1 billion. A floor of $300 or 3% of 
AGI would reduce the revenue loss by 30 to 40%, even if  there were 
significant bunching. The effect of the floor on increased giving depends 
critically on whether taxpayers’ behavior is guided by  conventional de- 
mand principles or by the net altruism rule. A reasonable conclusion is 
that a floor would reduce giving by less than the increased revenue but 
that the difference between them would not be very large. 
In conclusion, it should perhaps be stressed that the appropriate tax 
treatment of  charitable contributions depends on much more than the 
effects of  alternative tax  rules on  the magnitude  and distribution  of 
contributions and taxes. Andrews (1972), for example, has argued that a 
correct definition of net income requires deducting charitable gifts while 
Surrey (1973) has argued the opposite. Feldstein (1980) has emphasized 
that a tax subsidy of individual giving may be preferable to government 
spending for the same purpose even when a dollar of  tax revenue loss 
induces less than  a dollar of  additional giving, if  individual giving is 
influenced by the level of government spending on the particular activity. 
Still others have emphasized the administrative and compliance problems 
associated with extending the deduction to low income taxpayers, who 
are rarely audited. All these considerations are important but lie beyond 
the scope of  the current paper. 167  Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior 
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Comment  Harvey Galper 
My general overall evaluation of  the Feldstein-Lindsey paper (hereafter 
F-L) is that it is an ideal illustration of  how tax simulation work should 
Harvey Galper at the time of this writing was director, Office of Tax Analysis, United 
States Treasury. He is currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 168  Martin Feldstein/Lawrence B. Lindsey 
proceed methodologically. Modeling behavioral responses to  tax changes 
is not an easy undertaking. The data base one has to deal with may be 
incomplete in several respects; the particular tax changes which one may 
want to simulate may  not be easily translatable to price and income 
effects, which economists are accustomed to dealing with; and the empir- 
ical literature may  not  always provide  guidance on which price  and 
income elasticities to apply. Yet, as this paper demonstrates, through 
imaginative  solutions  simulation  results  can  be  provided  on  various 
effects of  proposed changes in tax law. 
I do, however, have some comments to make on this paper, starting 
with the review of  the empirical literature. There has accumulated over 
the last five years a significant literature on the responsiveness of charita- 
ble contributions to the tax price, much of  this literature resulting from 
efforts of one of the current authors. The tax price is defined essentially as 
1  minus the marginal tax rate of the donor, although some modifications 
for appreciated property may also be required. From a review of  the 
literature F-L conclude that the elasticity of giving with respect to the tax 
price is quite high-on the order of  1.3  in absolute terms-and  that this 
same elasticity can be used to describe the tax behavior of nonitemizers. 
This is a very key assumption in the analysis in this paper, even though 
simulations with lower elasticities are also examined to some degree. 
I find it quite difficult to accept as the general case an elasticity as high 
as  1.3 for nonitemizers.  On a priori  grounds, there are reasons why 
nonitemizers may be expected to exhibit less sensitivity to tax prices for 
charitable contributions. In fact, one reason why taxpayers may even 
take the standard deduction is that they are less sensitive to tax prices. 
In the end, of  course, the question is an empirical one. And while the 
literature has demonstrated clearly that individuals with higher marginal 
tax rates are highly sensitive to the price of giving, the case in my view has 
not been made for lower-income nonitemizers. In an excellent article that 
reviews this literature and provides evidence of their own empirical work, 
Clotfelter and Steuerle conclude that “estimates of  the price elasticity 
tend to vary by income class and are sensitive to the specification of  the 
regression model. The estimates from the most reasonable cross-sectional 
specifzcations range from -  0.4 to -  0.9 for low income taxpayers to -  1.7 
to -  1.8 for high income taxpayers.”’ 
Other researchers have also found a significant relation between higher 
absolute elasticity and higher income.*  It is true that various specifications 
1.  C. T. Clotfelter and C. E. Steuerle, “Charitable Contributions,” in H. J. Aaron and 
J. A. Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect Economic  Behavior  (Washington:  Brooking 
Institution, 1981), emphasis added. 
2. See, for example, M. Feldstein,  “The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions,’’ 
part 1,  “Aggregate and Distributional Effects,” National TaxJournal,  vol. 28 (March 1975); 
M. Feldstein and A. Taylor, “The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions,’’ Economer- 169  Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior 
do  cause the results to bounce around. But I would interpret the weight of 
evidence as indicating more modest price elasticities for lower-income 
taxpayers. Adding a possible lower tax consciousness for nonitemizers, I 
would conclude that an elasticity of  about -  0.7 would be more charac- 
teristic of  lower-income nonitemizers. 
As an aside, it should be noted that the econometric problems with 
respect to estimating the response of  behavior such as charitable giving to 
tax prices have not been fully resolved. To a degree, the problem of 
simultaneity between giving and tax price is handled by  taking as the 
measure of tax price the first-dollar price, that is, the price if  there were 
no charitable contributions made at all, rather than the last-dollar price, 
or the price  from the last dollar of  contributions made. Indeed, the 
empirical literature on this subject invoked by F-L in defending the -  1.3 
elasticity assumption generally uses the first-dollar price or some variant 
of it. One obvious problem is that for the actual simulations in this paper, 
the price elasticity is assumed to be that appropriate for the last-dollar 
price rather than the first-dollar price. The question here is, Are there 
any reasons  to expect elasticity with  respect  to the last-dollar  price, 
assuming it can be accurately estimated, to be significantly different from 
that found from reviewing the literature on the first-dollar price? 
Another much more general question is whether the decision to make a 
charitable contribution can be legitimately examined under the assump- 
tion that all other itemized deductions are given. In other words, itemiza- 
tion may be a much more complex simultaneous process than can be 
modeled by treating each deduction separately. There are obvious statis- 
tical problems in attempting to estimate several possible itemized deduc- 
tions simultaneously all subject to a schedule of  rising marginal tax rates. 
However, there are instances in this paper where implicitly or explicitly 
this  simultaneity issue  is raised.  For example,  some of  the elasticity 
findings from the empirical literature reported in the paper are based on 
the assumption that itemizers  will  continue to  itemize even if, in  the 
absence of  charitable giving, they find it advantageous to use the standard 
deduction. The implicit assumption must be that other deductions can be 
taken to offset the possible decline in contributions. If  this is so, then 
itemized  deductions  are indeed  interrelated  and cannot be examined 
independently. 
Also,  the discussion  of  bunching  by  F-L implies that a legitimate 
response to a proposal that allows a deduction only for charitable con- 
tributions in excess of  a floor amount is to concentrate deductions in 
particular years, that is, to try to exceed the floor in those years even if 
this is not possible in every year. However, why cannot this be done for all 
rica vol. 44 (November 1976); E. M. Sunley, “Federal and State Tax Policies,”  in D. W. 
Breneman and C.  E. Finn, Jr., eds., Public Policy and Private Higher Education (Washing- 
ton: Brookings Institution, 1978). 170  Martin FeldsteinJLawrence B. Lindsey 
itemized deductions together in order to exceed the standard deduction 
in some years? That is, a taxpayer could conceivably alter the timing of 
payment of  interest, taxes, and medical bills in addition to charitable 
contributions. If a taxpayer has such flexibility, there is again the possibil- 
ity of an interdependence  of deductions. Clotfelter especially has empha- 
sized that the  interaction between aparticulur  itemized deduction and the 
decision  to itemize can bias the estimates of  elasticities in  particular 
samples. 
These comments are offered only in the spirit of  encouraging addi- 
tional work in this area. With our current state of  knowledge, there is 
probably little more that can be done in the way of incorporating such 
effects into existing tax simulation models. 
In the analysis of  extending the contribution deduction to nonitemiz- 
ers, I  found very  appealing the use  of  a utility function  approach to 
analyze consumer choices under nonlinear budget constraints. However, 
I must confess to some disenchantment with the “net altruism” notion. 
According to this notion, individuals want to make a fixed net, that is, 
after-tax, contribution to charities regardless of  the tax price. It is cer- 
tainly true algebraically that such an approach is indistinguishable from 
an elasticity of -  1 in a traditional demand analysis. However, unlike a 
traditional  demand analysis, the net  altruism notion implies that the 
donor derives no utility whatsoever from the funds received, and dis- 
bursed, by the philanthropic organization-whether  for health research, 
education, or the cultural  enrichment  of  the community.  Only  the 
amount of  individual sacrifice is of concern to the donor. Such altruism 
seems of  a strange sort indeed. 
The treatment of  bunching  is an intriguing way of  dealing with  an 
unobservable possibility-the  concentration of gifts in particular years in 
response  to allowing  charitable  deductions  only  in  excess of  a  floor 
amount. In fact, this is illustrative of the ingenuity required to  use and run 
simulation models in general. Very often, the particular tax proposals to 
be analyzed do not lend themselves to strictly linear price and income 
rules.  The tax law abounds in  floors, phaseout  ranges,  and complex 
interactions which not only make the calculation of  the tax price itself 
very difficult but also cause taxpayers to engage in maximizing behavior 
that may  involve  intertemporal shifts of  income  or deductions.  The 
approach must be the one that is followed here: allow a range of  possible 
taxpayer responses and examine the sensitivity of  the results. 
Before simulations of  the effects of  allowing nonitemizers to deduct 
charitable contributions can be performed, it is necessary first to impute 
current charitable contributions to nonitemizers.  I have some reserva- 
3. C. T. Clotfelter,  “Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Panel of 
Taxpayers,” Journal of  Public Economics, vol. 13, no. 3 (June 1980). 171  Simulating Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior 
tions about the imputation procedure used in the NBER model. One 
indication of  my concern is that the total volume of  giving by nonitemiz- 
ers-on  the order of $18.5 billion-seems  very high. Total contributions 
of  itemizers and nonitemizers  amounted to about $37 billion in  1977 
under the F-L imputation procedures. This amount is about one-quarter 
higher than the most recent estimate for 1977 ($29.3 billion) set forth in 
Giving  USA,  a  publication  that  reports  on  trends  in  American 
philanthr~py.~  This would result in a ratio of  total giving to personal 
income of 2.4%, 20% greater than the previous peak of 2.0% ,  reached in 
1970. Treasury imputations for 1977 of  the giving of  nonitemizers are 
$12.3 billion,  about two-thirds of  the F-L result. This yields  a total 
contribution figure of $30 billion, quite close to the Giving USA estimate. 
Since the NBER imputation procedure reflects the assumption that the 
only difference between nonitemizers and itemizers is that the two groups 
face different tax prices and incomes, this assumption itself may require 
reexamination. The imputation procedures in the Treasury model take a 
somewhat different approach. The Treasury model makes imputations 
for all itemized deductions simultaneously, subject to the constraint that 
the sum of all such imputed deductions cannot exceed the zero bracket 
amount (the standard deduction). 
F-L recognizes that imputations cannot be so high as to cause taxpayers 
to itemize, and they try to control for this in their imputation procedures 
in two ways. First, nonitemizers are only compared with those itemizers 
who would continue to itemize even if they made no charitable contribu- 
tions. That is, those who itemize only because of  large charitable con- 
tributions are excluded from the reference group. Second, the model 
truncates imputed giving to reduce the possibility of  excessively high 
imputations. These procedures, however, are not particularly contrain- 
ing. The first restriction eliminates just the greatest outliers among the 
itemizers, and the truncation procedure has even less effect. For exam- 
ple, a joint  return with  AGI  of  $50,000 is  still allowed a maximum 
imputed gift of $1,700, almost twice the average giving of  itemizers in the 
$30,000 to $50,000 income class. For lower-income taxpayers, the trunca- 
tion is even less stringent. I would therefore encourage some experi- 
mentation with a simultaneous imputation procedure in which all itemiz- 
able expenses are imputed to nonitemizers but under the constraint that 
their sum cannot exceed the standard deduction. (One by-product of this 
approach  is that other itemizable  expenses can also be  examined  to 
determine their sensitivity to tax prices.) 
A few comments on the simulations themselves may be in order. First, 
since, except for the net altruism variant, floors on deductible contribu- 
4. American Association of  Fund Raising Journal, Giving USA, 25th Annual Issue, 
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tions serve to reduce the revenue loss considerably without greatly affect- 
ing giving,  a case could be made for adding a floor to current law- 
perhaps using the revenue gain for general rate cuts. If the simulations 
presented are reasonably accurate, the revenue gain is likely to be much 
greater than the cutback in giving. The results of such a simulation would 
be quite interesting. 
Second, it is now possible to estimate not only the long-run effect of 
these changes in tax rules, as presented in the F-L paper, but also the 
short-run  effects  on  a  year-to-year  basis  by  applying  the  work  of 
Cl~tfelter.~  Clotfelter finds considerable lags in adjusting to desired long- 
run behavior and estimates a six-year time period for 90% of the long-run 
solution to  be realized. Furthermore, in the case of  allowing nonitemizers 
to deduct charitable  contributions,  the lags may  be somewhat longer 
since Clotfelter also finds that new itemizers display less sensitivity to 
price changes than former itemizers. 
As a final comment, a point made by Kenneth Arrow in discussing the 
use  of  microeconomic simulation  models for public policy  analysis is 
worth emphasizing here. Arrow was critical of the excessive preoccupa- 
tion with budgetary costs in simulation models to the exclusion of  the 
economist’s  main  concerns-equity  and  efficiency.  In  his  words, 
“theoretically, the only justification for even considering budgetary costs 
as such is that they are financed by taxes which have their own distortion- 
ary ~ignificance.”~  This comment is applicable to the current paper as 
well.  Even if  the revenue  loss is less than the increase in giving, the 
revenue loss still must be made up in some fashion. Why not make fuller 
use  of  the considerable effort and ingenuity that have gone into the 
development of this model by undertaking a more complete analysis of 
this issue? In particular,  the utility  functions developed to determine 
consumer choices are just the tool needed to satisfy Arrow’s concern. 
It would be possible to examine alternative ways of raising the revenue 
that is lost by the proposals examined here to see who the gainers and 
losers are in a net sense and also to analyze whether overall social welfare 
has been improved. This would then provide the framework for an even 
more general approach in which the increase in tax rates required to 
finance these proposals affects other aspects of  behavior  such as the 
supply of  savings and labor. With such an analysis, we will be able to 
break out of  the mold of  narrowly comparing the revenue loss and the 
giving gain as if  an elasticity of  -  1 really meant something. 
5.  Clotfelter, “Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving.” 
6. K. J. Arrow, “Microdata Simulation: Current Status Problems, Prospects,” in R. H. 
Haveman and K. Hollenbeck,  eds., Microeconomic Simulation Models for Public Policy 
Analysis, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 264. 